


Learning the Preferences of Ignorant, Inconsistent Agents

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1. Motivation for learning human preferences

- **Scientific (economics, psychology)**: how do people value work vs. leisure, short-term vs. long-term, country vs. friends & family?
- **Machine learning (applications)**: recommendation (movie, job, dating), create tailored content.
- **Machine learning (long-term goal)**: the more systems **understand** our preferences, the more they can help us make **high stakes** decisions in **novel** circumstances.

Search for people, places and things

Home

Lisa

Lisa Larter

Edit Profile

FAVORITES

News Feed

Messages49

Events20+

Photos

Browse

Ads Manager

Social Fixer News

Done For You Pages20+

Lisa Larter

The Pilot Project 2...1

The Pilot Project G...2

PAGES

Exclusive Associat...1

Tanner the Little ...4

Branching Out

eWomenNetwork ...6

eWomenNetwork ...20+

eWomenNetwork Orang...6

eWomenNetwork ...20+

Pages Feed20+

Like Pages20+

GROUPS

TPP ATP

WIBWS

20VIC Marketing4

Create Group...

FRIENDS

Close Friends20+

APPS

Games8

Games Feed20+

INTERESTS

Clients

Add Interests...


Update Status

Add Photos/Video

What's on your mind?

SORT

Natalie Deschamps shared VR-Zone's photo.



Skateboard baby stroller that comes with brakes and handlebars for steering

Like VR-Zone for more amazing stuff

Like · Comment · Share · 4 minutes ago ·

Angela Azaria likes this.

Angela Azaria Hilarious.2 minutes ago · Like

Write a comment...

Christine Tripp at The Centurion Conference & Event Center

Looking forward to seeing Cara!

Like · Comment · Share · 11 minutes ago in Ottawa ·

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Trending

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2. Learning preferences with IRL

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (AI) / Structural Estimation (Econ):

- Unsupervised learning, assumed model is MDP, POMDP, RL.
- Learn from sequences of choices in complex environments (cf. Netflix)
- Learn utility/reward function not policy: enduring cause not contingent effects.
- People act on their preferences without ability to report them quantitatively (driving skill, detailed vacation plan)

3. The problem of systematic error

- IRL: infer preferences from observed actions ... assuming human fits (MDP/POMDP) model up to random (softmax) errors.
- But human make **systematic** errors! Person smokes every day but regrets it.
- Behavioral economics (hyperbolic discounting, Prospect Theory)
- Bounded cognition (forgetting, limited computational ability, etc.)

4. Learning from ignorant, inconsistent agents

Our approach:

1. build flexible generative models to capture a range of biases and cognitive bounds (while maintaining tractability)
2. jointly infer **biases** (or lack thereof) and **preferences** from behavior
3. if successful, can help humans overcome biases

5. Human bias: Time inconsistency

- Intuition: tonight you want to rise early but tomorrow you want to sleep in.
- Most prominent bias: addiction, procrastination, impulsiveness, will-power / pre-commitment.
- Formally, any non-exponential discounting implies time-inconsistency.


5. Human bias: Time inconsistency


Hyperbolic discounting

Discount factor = $1/(1+kt)$

At $t=0$, you prefer \$80 at $t=8$ to \$70 at $t=7$ (curve **shallow**)

At $t=7$, you re-evaluate and prefer \$70 now to \$80 tomorrow (curve **steep**).





5. Model for biased agent

MDP model:
$$\text{EU}_s [a] = U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s'} [a']]$$


with $s' \sim T(s, a)$ and $a' \sim C(s')$


MDP + Hyperbolic discounting (variable d for “delay” measures how far in the future the action a would take place):

$$\text{EU}_{s,d} [a] = \frac{1}{1 + kd} U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s', d+1} [a']]$$

6. Goal for examples and experiments

- Show that ignoring biases (assuming optimality) leads to mistakes in learning preferences
- Mistakes occur in simple, uncontrived, everyday scenarios.





5. Model for biased agent - NAIVE

MDP model:
$$\text{EU}_s [a] = U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s'} [a']]$$

with $s' \sim T(s, a)$ and $a' \sim C(s')$

MDP + Hyperbolic discounting (variable d for “delay” measures how far in the future the action a would take place):

$$\text{EU}_{s,d} [a] = \frac{1}{1 + kd} U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s', d+1} [a']]$$

$$a' \sim C(s', d + 1)$$

5. Model for biased agent - SOPHISTICATED

MDP model:
$$\text{EU}_s [a] = U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s'} [a']]$$


with $s' \sim T(s, a)$ and $a' \sim C(s')$

MDP + Hyperbolic discounting (variable d for “delay” measures how far in the future the action a would take place):


$$\text{EU}_{s,d} [a] = \frac{1}{1 + kd} U(s, a) + \mathbb{E}_{s', a'} [\text{EU}_{s', d+1} [a']]$$

$$a' \sim C(s', 0)$$


Naive





Sophisticated



6. Model for biases agent: Procrastination




6. Model for biased agent: Procrastination




7. Model for biased agent: Myopia

- **Simple myopia (near sighted):** ignore any rewards or costs after time $k1 > 0$ (even though you'll still be alive).
- **Bounded Value-of-Information:** ignore the value of information gained after time $k2 > 0$ (even though you will still get benefits from information).




7. Model for biased agent: Myopia

Myopic planning



Bounded VOI



agentmodels.org

Interactive, online tutorial and open-source library for constructing this kind of model (Work in progress).

Main sections:

- Agent models for one-player sequential problems (MDPs, POMDPs, RL), where agent can be biased
- Inference (IRL) for a large space of possible agents
- Multi-agent interactions: coordination, group preferences.

Tom's *decision rule* is to take action a that maximizes utility, i.e., the action

$$\arg \max_{a \in A} U(T(s, a))$$

In WebPPL, we can implement this utility-maximizing agent as a function `maxAgent` that takes a state $s \in S$ as input and returns an action. For Tom's choice between restaurants, we assume that the agent starts off in a state "default", denoting whatever Tom does before going off to eat. The program directly translates the decision rule above using the higher-order function `argMax`.

```
// Choose to eat at the Italian or French restaurants
var actions = ['italian', 'french'];

var transition = function(state, action){
  return (action === 'italian') ? 'pizza' : 'steak frites';
};

var utility = function(state){
  return (state === 'pizza') ? 1 : 0;
};


var maxAgent = function(state){
  return argMax(
    function(action){
      return utility(transition(state, action));
    },
    actions);
};

print("Agent chooses: " + maxAgent("default"));
```

run

Agent chooses: french

Full



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